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STUDENT ARTICLES
Act Locally, Apply Globally: Protecting
Consumers from International Cartels by
Applying Domestic Antitrust Law Globally
Ryan A. Haas*
The globalization of commerce and communication, of
economic production and finance, of the spread of
technology and weapons.., poses problems that can no
longer be solved within the framework of nation-states or
by the traditional method of agreements of sovereign states.
If current trends continue, the progressive undermining of
national sovereignty will necessitate the founding and
expansion of political institutions on the supranational
level, a process whose beginnings can already be
observed.1
Jirgen Habermas

I. Introduction
Beyond the new and promising opportunities it offers,
globalization often creates difficult problems that defy solution by
traditional mechanisms. 2 International price-fixing, or outputreducing, cartels formed by transnational companies expose a "seamy

* J.D. candidate, May 2004, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; Ph.D.
candidate, Philosophy, May 2004, Loyola University Chicago; M.A., Philosophy,
1999, California State University, San Francisco; B.A., Political Science, 1995, The
American University. The author would like to thank the editors at the Consumer
Law Review for their helpful comments and advice in preparing this Comment.
1 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: STUDIES IN POLITICAL

THEORY 106 (1999).
2 id. at 107.
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side" to globalization. 3 These cartels often escape prosecution under
international trade law and traditional domestic law. 4 Clearly, their
anticompetitive activity harms consumers worldwide. 5 International6
cartels have raised the price of gasoline, vitamins, and soft drinks.
They have made it more expensive for individuals and museums to
purchase artwork and artifacts at auctions around the world.7
Moreover, there is evidence that private anticompetitive agreements
between transnational corporations are forming a new barrier to a
truly open and fair global marketplace. 8 Preventing such conduct may
require new supranational mechanisms, as philosopher Habermas
suggested. 9
A trend has recently developed in several countries, however,
to enforce domestic anticompetition laws over extraterritorial conduct
that has a harmful effect on domestic commerce.' 0 In fact, the United
States judiciary recently addressed the issue of whether U.S. antitrust
laws apply to cases involving injuries sustained as a result of foreign
anticompetitive conduct when that conduct also has a direct and
substantial effect on commerce in the United States."1 Interpreting the
12
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 ("FTAIA"),
federal district courts have generally refused to apply U.S. antitrust
law to such conduct, dismissing such cases for lack of subject matter

3 See Stephen Labaton, The World Gets Tough on Fixing Prices, N.Y. TIMES,

June 3, 2001, § 3, at 1.
4 See Julian Epstein, The Other Side of Harmony: Can Trade and Competition
Laws Work Together in the InternationalMarketplace?, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
343, 346 (2002).
5 See Labaton, supra note 3, at 1.
6

Id.

7 id.
8 Epstein, supra note 4, at 345.

9 See id. at 364-68. Epstein provides a discussion of how supranational
mechanisms, such as the WTO, could address the problem of anticompetitive
cartels that transcend state boundaries. Id.
'0See Spencer Weber Waller, The Twilight of Comity, 38 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L

L. 563, 574 (2000).

' Ronald W. Davis, InternationalCartel and Monopolization Cases Expose a
Gap in Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 ANTITRUST 53, 53 (2001).
12Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 § 402, 15 U.S.C. § 6a
(2000).
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jurisdiction. 13 Yet, at the appellate level, two circuits recently split on
the issue. The Fifth Circuit held that the FTAIA precludes U.S. courts
from asserting jurisdiction over anticompetitive conduct that occurs
abroad when the plaintiff is injured abroad. 14 The Second Circuit,
however, held that the FTAIA allows antitrust laws to regulate such
conduct when it has a direct and substantial effect on the U.S.
market. 15 While the Fifth Circuit expressed concern over opening the
floodgates to global litigation,' 6 the Second Circuit stressed the
importance of deterring anticompetitive conduct that has harmful
effects in the United States.' 7
This Comment will examine the circuit split. Part II will
present a background to the extraterritorial application of antitrust
law in the United States. Part III will discuss the cases illustrating this
split: Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. Herremac v.o.f, in the Fifth
Circuit; and Kruman v. Christie's International Plc, in the Second
Circuit. Part IV of this Comment will analyze both opinions, arguing
that the Second Circuit's holding provides a more precise
interpretation of the plain meaning of the FTAIA, offers a lessselective reading of the FTAIA's legislative history, presents a more
effective integration of relevant case law, protects the important
policy of deterrence, and offers a solution to the problem of
international cartels without violating international law. Based on this
analysis, Part IV will propose that the Second Circuit's approach be
adopted as a way to better deter the formation of foreign cartels and
to better protect consumers.

II. Background
This section will first survey early interpretations of the
extraterritorial application of antitrust law leading to the development
of the "effects test" and its modification through considerations of
international comity and the interest-balancing approach. Next, this
section will discuss the FTAIA and its effect on the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust law. Finally, it will discuss recent federal
13 Davis, supra note 11, at 54.
14 Den

Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac v.o.f., 241 F.3d 420, 431

(5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002).
15

Kruman v. Christie's Int'l Plc, 284 F.3d 384, 401-02 (2d Cir. 2002).

16 See

Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 431.
17 See Kruman, 284 F.3d at 401-02; see also Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines,
Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 306-07 (3d Cir. 2002) (discussing this split).

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 15: 2

district court decisions that have interpreted the FTAIA to bar claims
for antitrust injuries sustained outside the United States, even when
those injuries are caused by conduct that has a substantial effect on
commerce within the United States.
A. Early Interpretations of Extraterritoriality and Antitrust
Law: The Effects Test and Comity
The Sherman Act and the Clayton Act provide the foundation
of U.S. antitrust law.' 8 The Sherman Act deals primarily with
19
defendants by prohibiting certain types of anticompetitive activity.
The Clayton Act deals primarily with plaintiffs by requiring that a
private plaintiff suffer an injury, or be threatened with an injury,
caused by a violation of the Sherman Act, in order to bring a civil
suit. In order to sue specifically for damages, however, the plaintiff
must suffer an actual injury. 2 1 Whether a private plaintiff has been
injured or not, the Sherman Act also allows the Justice Department to
invoke criminal proceedings for violations of antitrust laws,
22
potentially imposing treble damages on violators.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that every "conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is ...illegal. 23 Under § 1, it is per se illegal for two
or more persons to enter into any anticompetitive agreement, such as
an agreement to fix prices or reduce output. 24 The antitrust laws,
therefore, promote competition by prohibiting anticompetitive
conduct. 25 The dual purpose of antitrust law is to compensate persons
18 See

Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-

15 (2000).
'9 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2; see also Kruman, 284 F.3d at 397.
20

15 U.S.C. § 15; see Kruman, 284 F.3d at 397 (discussing the Sherman and

Clayton Acts).

See Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Value Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409, 1419
(7th Cir. 1989) (noting that a plaintiff may bring an action for injunctive relief for a
threatened antitrust injury as in, for example, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
21

Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130 (1969)).
22

15 U.S.C. § 4. Treble damages are damages that "are three times the amount

that the fact-finder determines is owed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 322 (7th ed.

2000).
23

15 U.S.C. § 1.

24

See Epstein, supra note 4, at 365.

25

Id. at 360.
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or companies for their injuries and to deter the formation of cartels
and other anticompetitive behavior.26 Consequently, U.S. antitrust
laws protect consumers from the harmful effects
of anticompetitive
28
conduct. 27 But, how far do the laws truly reach?
In 1909, the Supreme Court first considered the
extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law in American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co. 29 The Court refused to apply the Sherman Act's
prohibitions on anticompetitive conduct against United Fruit, an
American company that persuaded the government of Costa Rica to
seize critical land needed by its competitor, American Banana, to
distribute produce. The Court noted the importance of international
comity, which precludes U.S. courts from imposing judgments on the
decisions of foreign governments. 3 1 In 1927, the Court modified its
position, holding that a plaintiff could bring a Sherman Act claim
against a foreign defendant provided that some of the defendant's
conduct occurred within the United States.32
Then, in an influential decision issued in 1945, the Second
Circuit developed an "effects test" to determine whether U.S.
antitrust law could be applied to foreign anticompetitive conduct. 33 In
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, the Second Circuit held
that Congress did not intend to punish violators of U.S. antitrust laws
for conduct that has no effect within the United States. 34 "On the
other hand," the court held, "any state may impose liabilities, even
26

2

PHILLIP AREEDA

& HERBERT HOVENKAMP,

ANTITRUST LAW I

355(b) (2d

ed. 2000).
27 See Labaton, supra note 3.

28 In international law, this is a question of prescriptive jurisdiction (the power
of states to make laws), as opposed to adjudicatory jurisdiction (the power of courts
to render judgments) and executive jurisdiction (the power to enforce laws and
judicial decisions). See MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW

715-16 (2d ed. 2001).
29 Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
30 Id. at 356.

31Id. Comity is defined as "[c]ourtesy among political entities (as nations,
states, or courts of different jurisdictions), involving esp. mutual recognition of
legislative, executive, and judicial acts." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 213 (7th ed.
2000).
32 See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1927).
33 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-45 (2d Cir.
1945) [hereinafter Alcoa].
34 Id. at 443 (citations omitted).
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upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders
that has consequences within its borders which the state
reprehends .
"...Thus, under Alcoa, the effect of the prohibited
conduct on the U.S. market, rather than the situs of the
conduct,
36
determined the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law.
Application of the effects test proved confusing, and it was
eventually modified by the Ninth Circuit's interest-balancing test in
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America. 37 In applying the
interest-balancing test, the Ninth Circuit attempted to account for
38
international comity, a factor largely ignored by the effects test.
Although the effects test seemingly expanded the application of U.S.
antitrust law, international comity as a doctrine of limitation was still
the "jurisdictional rule of reason." 39 In Timberlane Lumber, the Ninth
Circuit weighed principles of comity against domestic effects in
40
determining the scope of U.S. antitrust law over foreign conduct.
Other circuits soon followed
Timberlane and adopted similar comity41
sensitive approaches.
In the years after Timberlane Lumber, courts continued to
42
modify
effects
from Alcoa
in otherCard
ways.Ass'n,
For the
instance,
in
NationaltheBank
of test
Canada
v. Interbank
Second

35 Alcoa,

148 F.2d at 443.
36 Id. at 443-44; see Spencer Weber Waller, The United States as Antitrust
Courtroom to the World: Jurisdiction and Standing Issues in Transnational
Litigation, 14 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 523, 525 (2002).
3' Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir.
1976);
see Salil K. Mehra, Deterrence: The Private Remedy and International Antitrust
Cases, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNT'L L. 275, 285 (2002); see also Den Norkse Stats
Oljeselskap As v. HerreMac v.o.f., 241 F.3d 420, 424 n.12 (5th Cir. 2001)
(discussing the history of the modification of the effects test).
38 Mehra, supra note 37, at 285.
39Waller, supra note

10, at 564 (quoting KINGMAN BREWSTER, JR.,
446 (1958)).
40 Timberlane Lumber, 549 F.2d at 613; see also Waller, supra note 36, at
525-26 (providing a good discussion of Timberlane Lumber and comity).
41 See, e.g., Am. Rice, Inc. v. Ark. Rice Growers Co-op Ass'n, 701 F.2d
408,
413 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Mehra, supra note 37, at 284-85 (discussing the
interest-balancing approach).
42 See Davis, supra note 11, at 53. A modified test was applied to tourist
services in the Dominican Republic, beer sales in the Bahamas, and movie
distribution in South Africa. See id. at 55.
ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
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Circuit applied a modified version of its effects test.4 3 It held that
federal courts have jurisdiction to hear antitrust claims arising out of
conduct directed at foreign markets if the conduct either: (1) reduces
the competitiveness of commerce in the United States; or (2) makes
anticompetitive conduct possible, which is directed at commerce in
the United States.4 4

B. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
The general disagreement over the extraterritorial reach of
U.S. antitrust law and the assorted tests developed by the courts have
made the case law "confusing and unsettled." 5 Congress reacted in
1982 by amending the Sherman Act with the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act ("FFAIA").4' The FTAIA provides the following:
[The Sherman Act] shall not apply to conduct involving
trade or commerce (other than import trade or import
commerce) with foreign nations unless (1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect (A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce
with foreign nations, or on import trade or import
commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign
nations, of a person engaged in such trade or commerce in
the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of
section 1 to 7 of this title, other than this section.4 7
In a House Report on the F'AIA, Congress noted, "the domestic
'effect' that may serve as the predicate for antitrust jurisdiction under
'4 8
the bill must be of the type that the antitrust laws prohibit.
43
44

Nat'l Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1981).
id.

45 Den Norkse, 241 F.3d at 423-24; see also H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 2-3
(1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2487-88 (recognizing the uncertainty

throughout U.S. courts over the reach of antitrust laws); Waller, supra note 10, at
568-69 (discussing this uncertainty).
46 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96
Stat. 1246 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000)).
47 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
48

H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 11 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487,
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Although it was intended to clarify the reach of U.S. antitrust
law, the FTAIA is notoriously vague and has resulted in inconsistent
judicial interpretations. 49 Similarly, the legislative history of the
FTAIA is open to varying interpretations. For example, in the same
House Report cited above, Congress noted that the FTAIA was not
"intended to confer jurisdiction on injured foreign persons when that
injury arose from conduct with no anticompetitive effects in the
domestic marketplace.",5 1 This "require[s] that the 'effect' providing
the jurisdictional nexus must also be the basis for the injury alleged
under the antitrust laws." 52 The Report continues, however, that this
requirement does not mean that "the impact of the illegal conduct
must be experienced by the injured party within the United States. 53
When the Supreme Court first interpreted the FTAIA, in
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, it significantly restricted the
importance of international comity. 54 In Hartford Fire, the Court held
that U.S. antitrust laws apply to anticompetitive conduct outside the
United States as long as the conduct has a direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce. 55 More importantly,
the Court held that international comity only prevents U.S. courts
from asserting jurisdiction to enforce U.S. antitrust
law when another
56
nation's law mandates the prohibited conduct.
With the "near death blow" dealt to international comity in
Hartford Fire, the issue before the courts has changed.57 Now the
focus is whether a plaintiff, injured outside of the United States by
conduct that would normally violate the Sherman Act but has
different anticompetitive effects within the United States, still has a

2496 (citing Nat'l Bank of Can., 666 F.2d at 8).
49 Mehra, supra note 37, at 286-87. See also Waller, supra note 36, at 524
(describing the FTAIA as "badly-written").
50 Davis, supra note 11, at 56.
5' H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 11 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487,

2496.
52

Id. at 12.

53 id.
54 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993).
55 Id. at 799.
56 Id.; see Mehra, supra note 37, at 287; Waller, supra note 10, at 564 (noting
that this decision dealt comity a near death blow in antitrust law application).
57 Waller, supra note 10, at 564, 569.
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claim under the FTAIA. 58 In re Copper Antitrust Litigation involved
mostly foreign corporations as plaintiffs, which sued defendants for
injuries allegedly caused from being "squeezed" on the London
Metals Exchange when the defendants conspired to corner the copper
market.59 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' conduct caused
an artificial increase in U.S. copper prices. 6 0 The district court
dismissed the claims, finding that it would be unreasonable to hold
that Congress intended to provide a forum for mostly foreign
plaintiffs who were injured abroad by effects felt abroad, and not in
the United States, even if the wrongdoers' conduct produced other
6
anticompetitive effects in the United States. '

Two other district courts have recently come to the same
conclusion. In Den Norske Stats Qljeselskap As v. HerreMac v.o.f,
the Southern District of Texas held that the plaintiff, a Norwegian oil
company, could not bring an antitrust claim against an international
cartel of providers of heavy-lift barge services.6 2 The defendants
allegedly entered into agreements to allocate territories and rig bids,
resulting in an inflated price for their services and ultimately causing

58 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2) (2000);

see Davis, supra note 11, at 53-54. A
corresponding issue has recently been decided in front of the Seventh Circuit
involving whether the FITAIA provides a limit to the subject matter jurisdiction of
federal courts, or whether it involves an element of a plaintiff's claim. United
Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Co., 2003 WL 910592 (7th Cir. 2003). A
majority of the court held that the FTAIA's limitation on the Sherman Act's
application to conduct affecting domestic commerce involved subject matter
jurisdiction. Id. at *8-9. It is worth noting that both cases involved in the circuit
split discussed in this Comment were appeals of motions to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. See Den Norkse Stats Oljeselskap As v. HerreMac
v.o.f., 241 F.3d 420, 421 (5th Cir. 2001); Kruman v. Christie's Int'l Plc, 284 F.3d
384, 390 (2d Cir. 2002).
'9Metallgesellschaft AG v. Sumitomo Corp., 117 F. Supp. 2d 875, 879 (W.D.
Wis. 2000) [hereinafter In re Copper Antitrust Litig.], rev'd and remanded by 2003
WL 1665352 (7th Cir. 2003). The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's
decision without resolving the issue described in this Comment, noting that "we
reserve this question for another day, because in our view the result in the case now
before us would be the same no matter which side of the debate [between the Fifth
and Second Circuits] we joined." Metallgesellschaft AG v. Sumitomo Corp., 2003
WL 1665352, at *5 (7th Cir. 2003).
60 In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 117 F. Supp. 2d at 879-80.
61 Id. at 887.

62 See Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac v.o.f., 241 F.3d 420, 423
(5th Cir. 2001) (discussing the district court's finding).
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the plaintiff to charge higher oil prices in the United States. 63 Despite
the alleged U.S. price increase, the district court found that the
FTAIA precluded subject matter jurisdiction over the claim because
the plaintiff s injuries were sustained abroad.6 4
Similarly, in Kruman v. Christie's International Plc, the
Southern District of New York recently held that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over claims against the world's two largest auction
service providers, Christie's International Plc and Sotheby's
International, Inc., for an alleged price fixing conspiracy were
impermissible under the FTAIA. 65 The court held that because the
plaintiffs' injuries were sustained at auctions held abroad, granting
the plaintiffs a remedy "would be an unwarranted assertion of
American power. ' 66 Citing In re Copper Antitrust Litigation, the
court concluded that the FTAIA barred the plaintiffs' claims because
the anticompetitive effects felt in the United States did not cause the
67
plaintiffs' injuries.

III. Discussion
On appeal, Den Norske and Kruman created a circuit split
when the Fifth and Second Circuits interpreted § 6a(2) of the FTAIA
differently. The Circuits disagreed over whether the FTAIA barred
claims when the anticompetitive effects felt in the United States did
not cause a plaintiffs' injuries. 68 Accordingly, this section will
discuss the Fifth Circuit's holding in Den Norske that such claims are
not actionable under the FTAIA and the Second Circuit's contrary
interpretation in Kruman.
A. Heavy-Lift Barge Conspiracy: Den Norkse Stats Oljeselskap
As v. HerreMac v.o.f.
The plaintiff in Den Norske (hereinafter "Statoil") was a
Norwegian oil company that owned and operated oil and gas drilling

63Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 423.
64 Id.
65 Kruman v. Christie's Int'l Plc, 129 F. Supp. 2d 620, 626 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
66

Kruman, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 626.

67 Id. at 625 (citing In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 117 F. Supp. 2d at 883).
61 See Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 306-07 (3d Cir.
2002) (recognizing and discussing this split).
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platforms exclusively in the North Sea.6 9 Statoil filed an antitrust
claim against defendants, who were providers of heavy-lift barge
services in the Gulf of Mexico, the North Sea, and East Asia. °
Heavy-lift barges are capable of lifting and transporting offshore oil
platforms that weigh in excess of 4,000 tons.7 ' Only six or seven such
barges existed in the world between 1993 and 1997.72 They were
controlled by three companies: HerreMac, a Dutch corporation;
Saipem, a British corporation; and McDermott, an American
corporation.73 Statoil alleged that these three companies conspired to
allocate customers and territories in order to inflate the price of their
services.74 Allegedly, this resulted in inflated fees for heavy-lift barge
services, which forced Statoil to charge higher prices for oil it
exported to the United States - an average of 400,000 barrels of oil
filed suit for a violation of the Sherman Act. 76
per day.75 Thus, Statoil 75
The Fifth Circuit noted that the question of whether Statoil
could bring its claim under U.S. law was one of first impression, thus
requiring the court to interpret the FTAIA.77 Statoil argued that the
market for heavy-lift barge services is a single, unified, global
market, and that because the United States is part of this worldwide
market, the effect of the conspiracy, whether caused by conduct in
the United States or in the North Sea, gives rise to a claim under the
Sherman Act. 78 Statoil further argued that the FTAIA was not
intended to preclude recovery by foreign plaintiffs based on the situs
of their injury.79
8 ° First, the court
arguments.
rejected
The itFifth
Circuitthat
between
transactions
foreignthese
commercial
"doubt[s]
noted, that

69 Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 422.
70

id.

71

Id.

72

Id.

73 Id. at 422 & n.2.
74 Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 422.
71 Id. at 422 & n.4.
76

Id. at 422.

77Id. at 423.
78

Id. at 425.

79 Id.
80

id.
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foreign entities in foreign waters is conduct cognizable by federal
courts under the Sherman Act." 81 Moreover, the court held that the
plain meaning of the § 6a(2) of the FTAIA required that Statoil's
82
claim be based on the anticompetitive
effect of the defendants'
United States.
the
in
felt
conduct
Second, the court referred to the House Report on the FTAIA,
which states that the purpose of the FTAIA is to "more clearly
establish when antitrust liability attaches to international business
activities. ' 83 The court inferred from the House Report that Congress
intended to exclude purely foreign transactions from the scope of
U.S. antitrust law.84
Finally, the court held that its conclusion was consistent with
the few district court cases that had addressed this issue." The Fifth
Circuit found that in every case where jurisdiction was upheld under
the FTAIA, the effect on U.S. commerce was the source of the
plaintiff's injury. 86 Therefore, from the plain meaning of the FTAIA,
the legislative history, and the applicable case law, the Fifth Circuit
held that in order for a plaintiff to bring a claim under U.S. antitrust
law, its injury must arise from the anticompetitive
effect of the
87
defendant's conduct on U.S. commerce.
B. Judge Higginbotham's Dissent
Judge Higginbotham submitted a vigorous
Norske, arguing that Statoil could bring its claim
based on the text of the FTAIA and its legislative
Judge Higginbotham emphasized the importance

81 Den

dissent in Den
under U.S. law
history. 88 First,
of the alleged

Norske, 241 F.3d at 426.

82

Id. at 427.

83

Id at 428 (citing H.R.

REP. No. 97-686, at 5 (1982),

reprinted in 1982

U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2490).
'4

Id. at 428.

85

Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 429 (citing S. Megga Telecom Ltd. v. Lucent

Tech., Inc., No. 96-357-SLR, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2312 (D. Del. Feb. 14, 1997);
Porters, S.A. v. Hanes Printables, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 494 (M.D.N.C. 1987)) (other
citations omitted).
86Id. at 430-31 (finding that there were no cases supporting Statoil's
interpretation of the FTAIA) (citations omitted).
87 Id. at 430.
88

Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 431 (Higginbotham, J.,
dissenting).
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conspiracy, which "placed United States markets at the mercy of
monopoly charges in an industry vital to national security." 89 He
asserted that Congress did not intend to close the door to recovery for
illegal conduct injuring a foreign company90 that also produces direct
and substantial effects in the United States.
In support of his argument, Judge Higginbotham noted that
§ 6a(1) of the FTAIA 9 1, requires that anticompetitive conduct affect
either domestic import commerce or the export commerce of a person
in the United States. 92 Section 6a(2) requires that this effect "give rise
to a claim" under the Sherman Act, not necessarily the plaintiff's
specific claim. 93 Judge Higginbotham maintained that "[i]f the
drafters of the FTAIA had wished to say 'the claim' instead of 'a
claim' they certainly would have." 94 Although the text is "sufficiently
ambiguous" to allow for either interpretation, Judge Higginbotham
argued that95his interpretation was more faithful to the plain meaning
of the text.
Judge Higginbotham further argued that the statutory context
and legislative history support his reading of § 6a(2).96 First, he noted
that the statutory context of the FTAIA, especially Title I of the
Export Trading Company Act of 1982 under which the FTAIA was
enacted, contains language expressing Congress' intent to extend the
application of antitrust law to export trade. 97 Judge Higginbotham
asserted that the FTAIA was enacted to exempt export trading from
antitrust law, not to limit liability of foreign cartels that have a direct
and substantial effect on commerce in the United States. 98 Second, he
argued that the legislative history demonstrates that Congress did not
intend the FTAIA to exclude all persons injured abroad from

89

Id. (Higginbotham, J.,
dissenting).

90 Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
91

Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 § 402, 15 U.S.C. § 6a

(2000).
92

Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 432 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).

93

Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

9

Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
Id. at 433 (Higginbotham, J.,
dissenting).

95
96

Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).

97

Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).

98
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recovering under U.S. antitrust law. 99 Therefore, because Statoil was
injured by a conspiracy that had a substantial effect on U.S.
commerce, Judge Higginbotham argued, federal
courts do have
00
claim.
Statoil's
hear
to
jurisdiction
matter
subject
C. Auction House Conspiracy: Kruman v. Christie's International

Plc
Christie's International Plc (hereinafter "Christie's") and
Sotheby's Holdings, Inc. (hereinafter "Sotheby's") are the world's
0
first and second largest auctioneers of fine art and collectibles.'1
Together they control roughly 97% of the world market.'0 2 Both
Christie's and Sotheby's hold auctions around the world, and they
collect a commission from the seller of an item (a "seller's
0 3
commission") and a fee from the purchaser (a "buyer's premium").
Allegedly, from late 1992 until at least February 7, 2000, Christie's
and Sotheby's agreed to fix their buyer's premiums at identical levels
and, beginning in 1995, they agreed to set their seller's commissions
at identical levels. 10 4 They also allegedly conspired to coordinate
their negotiation policies to0 5 prevent each other from setting a
competitive commission fee.1
After the United States Department of Justice initiated an
antitrust investigation of the two auction houses, a group of
purchasers who bought goods at auctions held outside the United
States, filed a class action suit in the District Court for the Southern
District of New York for antitrust violations. °6 The district court
dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because
the effect of the defendants'
conduct on U.S. commerce did not cause
07
injuries.'
plaintiffs'
the
On appeal, the Second Circuit noted that it had modified the

99 Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 436 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
'oo Id. at 438 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
101 Kruman v. Christie's Int'l Plc, 284 F.3d 384, 390 (2d Cir. 2002).
102 id.

103Id.
104 id.
105

Kruman, 284 F.3d at 390-91.

116 Id.at
107

id.

391.
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"effects test" in National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n to
require that the anticompetitive conduct's effect on U.S. commerce
either: (1) reduce the competitiveness of the domestic market; or (2)
make possible anticompetitive conduct directed at the domestic
market. The court held that the FTAIA did not alter the National
Bank of Canada test by requiring that the domestic effect 1of
09
anticompetitive conduct abroad be the basis of a plaintiff's injury.
Rather, the court reversed the district court and concluded that federal
courts have subject matter jurisdiction over a claim by a plaintiff who
is injured outside the United States by anticompetitive
conduct that
0
has substantial effect on U.S. commerce."
The Kruman court reasoned that the FTAIA was clearly
enacted as an amendment to the Sherman Act, which deals primarily
with defendants."' If Congress had intended the FTAIA to limit the
kinds of injuries plaintiffs must suffer in order to bring a suit, it
would have amended the Clayton Act, which deals primarily with
plaintiffs."X2 Therefore, the court held, § 6a(2) "only requires that the
domestic effect" of anticompetitive conduct abroad "violate the
substantive provisions of the Sherman Act."'13 Echoing Judge
Higginbotham, the court noted that requiring the domestic effect to
be the cause of a plaintiff's injury would necessitate a revision of the
language of § 6a(2) from the domestic effect
giving "rise to a claim"
14
'
claim."'
plaintiff's
the
to
"rise
to it giving
Furthermore, the Second Circuit found that Congress intended
to follow the test from National Bank of Canada, which supports a
broader reading of § 6a(2)." 15 Congress even cited to the case noting
that "the domestic 'effect' that may serve as the predicate for antitrust
jurisdiction under the bill must be of the type that the antitrust laws
prohibit." 16 The Second Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs in

108 Id. at

399; see also Nat'l Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6,

8 (2d Cir. 1981) (discussing this modification of the effects test).
109

Kruman, 284 F.3d at 399.

110Id.

...Id; see 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
112Kruman, 284 F.3d at 400.
113id.
114Id.

115Id.at 401.
116Id.(quoting H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 11 (1982) (citing Nat'l Bank of Can.,
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Kruman could bring their claims under U.S. law against Christie's
and Sotheby's because their injuries were caused by anticompetitive
conduct prohibited by the Sherman Act, and that conduct had a
substantial effect on commerce in the United States. 7 The Court
remanded the8 case for further proceedings consistent with this
conclusion. "

IV. Analysis
The Fifth Circuit in Den Norske and the Second Circuit in
Kruman relied on the same sources in their opinions: the plain
language of the FTAIA, the legislative history, and the relevant case
law. Each circuit, however, reached a different conclusion." 9 This
section will review both decisions and argue in favor of the Second
Circuit's approach. That approach recognizes the importance of
deterring anticompetitive conduct without violating of international
law. 120
A. The Plain Language of the FTAIA
The FTAIA primarily concerns jurisdiction over export
commerce.
It states that non-import commerce is covered by U.S.
antitrust 22
law only when it produces anticompetitive effects in the U.S.
market.

The Fifth Circuit found that, on its face, the FTAIA exempts
commercial transactions between foreign entities in foreign territories
from U.S. antitrust law. 123 Thus, a plain language reading, according
to the Fifth Circuit, requires a plaintiffs injury to arise out of the

666 F.2d at 8)).
117 Kruman, 284 F.3d at
403.
118

Id.

"9

See Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 425; Kruman, 284 F.3d at 395.
See Kruman, 284 F.3d at 403 n.10 (discussing how its decision accords

120

with various treaties in force in the United States).
121 See Waller, supra note 36, at 529.
122 15 U.S.C. § 6a(l) (2000) (providing that U.S. antitrust law applies to

export commerce with foreign nations if such commerce has a direct, substantial
and reasonably foreseeable effect in the United States); see also Mehra, supra note
37, at 290.
123 Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 426; see also 15 U.S.C. § 6a(2).
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domestic effect of the anticompetitive conduct.124 In responding to
Judge Higginbotham's dissent, the majority argued that its reading
"produces the precise result intended by Congress": that "foreign
purchasers should enjoy the protection of our antitrust laws in the
domestic marketplace, just as our citizens do."'1 25 According to the
Fifth Circuit, however, the FTAIA precludes courts from asserting
jurisdiction over claims involving injuries sustained abroad as a result
of foreign
conduct that also has effects on commerce in the United
6
States. 1
The Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the plain language of the
FTAIA, however, is not really a "plain language" reading because it
assumes that Congress intended to preclude U.S. law from applying
to injuries sustained outside of the United States. 127 As Judge
Higginbotham noted, the majority in Den Norske required the effect
of anticompetitive conduct on U.S. commerce to give rise to the
plaintiff's claim. 28 But, the text does not say that.' 29 Rather, it says
that the effect must give rise to a Sherman Act claim. 30 The plain
language reading by the Second Circuit in Kruman reiterated Judge
Higginbotham's argument that the indefinite article "a"in "gives rise
to a claim" means that the anticompetitive conduct gives rise to any
3
claim under the Sherman Act, not necessarily the plaintiff's claim.' 1
Moreover, the Second Circuit noted that the FTAIA makes no
reference to the Clayton Act - the antitrust law that grants plaintiffs a
private right of action for injuries suffered from Sherman Act
violations. 132 The text of the FTAIA does not "require that the
domestic effect give rise to an injury that would serve as the basis for
a Clayton Act action." 1 33 Rather, the text only requires that "the

124

Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 427.

125

Id. at 427 n.23 (citing H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 10-11 (1982)).

126 Den Norske,
127

241 F.3d. at 427.

See id. at 432 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).

128 Id. at

432 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).

129 Id. (Higginbotham,

J., dissenting).

130Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
131 Kruman,

284 F.3d at 400 (finding that Congress intentionally used the
indefinite article "a" instead of the definite article "the"); see also Davis, supra note
11, at 56 (asserting that the "literal text of the statue supports this conclusion").
132 Kruman, 284 F.3d at 400.
133

Id.
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domestic effect violate the substantive provisions of the Sherman
Act."' 34 If Congress intended to modify the sort of claims that could
be brought by private plaintiffs under the FTAIA, it would have
modified the Clayton Act as well as the Sherman Act, but it did
not.' 35 Consequently, the Second Circuit's interpretation of 36the
FTAIA is a better expression of the plain meaning of the FTAIA.
Furthermore, while commentators have noted, and Judge
Higginbotham acknowledged, that "it is not self-evident" that the
plain language of the FTAIA compels either interpretation,137 reading
§ 6a(2) to require that the domestic effect give rise to the plaintiff's
claim could have unintended consequences. 138 It would allow
conduct that is prohibited within the United States to escape
prohibition if the injury from the conduct occurs outside of the
United States, even if the effect on the United States is as substantial
as if the injury had occurred within the United States.' 39 The Second
Circuit's reading avoids this consequence.140
B. Legislative History
The Fifth Circuit and the Second Circuit relied on the same
4
legislative history to support their interpretations of the FTAIA.1 1
The Fifth Circuit emphasized that Congress' intent was to preclude
"wholly foreign transactions as well as export transactions" from
recovery under U.S. law. 142 Judge Higginbotham's criticism,
however, centered on how the majority in Den Norske overlooked the
areas of the legislative history where Congress spoke with more
particularity on the specific question posed.

From a reading of the

'34

Kruman, 284 F.3d at 400.

135

id.

136

See Davis, supra note 11, at 56 (recognizing this type of reading as a more

literal interpretation).
137 Mehra, supra note 37, at 292; see also Den Norske, 241 F.3d at
433
(Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (noting that "the text of the FTAIA compels neither
the majority's reading or mine .... ").
138 See Mehra, supra note 37, at 292.
139

See id. at 291.

140

Kruman, 284 F.3d at 400.

14'

Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 428; Kruman, 284 F.3d at 395.
Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 428 (citing H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 10 (1982)).

142

141

Id. at 433-34 n. II (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
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same House Report, Judge Higginbotham noted that the FTAIA was
designed to exempt certain export activity from antitrust scrutiny, not
to limit the liability of transnational conspiracies affecting U.S.
commerce. 144 The Second Circuit in Kruman found that the
legislative history was consistent with the notion that the illegal
anticompetitive conduct need
not be experienced by the injured party
145
within the United States.
While the legislative history provides support for both
readings of the FTAIA, the Fifth Circuit's reading has less contextual
support. 14 6 The Fifth Circuit stressed the House Report's intention
that the effect of the conduct in the United States "also be the basis of
the alleged injury"; 147 however, if taken in context, the meaning
becomes different. 148 The next sentence in the House Report states
that "[t]his does not, however, mean that the impact of the illegal
conduct must be experienced by the injured party within the United
States."' 149 This supports the Second Circuit's view of the legislative
history because Congress' intent was that the injury need not be felt
within the United States. 50 In addition, as the Second Circuit pointed
out, Congress cited National Bank of Canada as an example of the
type of test it intended under the FTAIA, which further supports the
Second Circuit's broader interpretation of the FTAIA.151
C. Case Law and the FTAIA
The Fifth Circuit in Den Norske argued that its holding was
consistent with the few courts that have directly addressed this

144 Id.

at 433 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).

145Kruman, 284 F.3d at 400 n.8.
146See Davis, supra note 11, at 56 (stating that the Fifth Circuit
either
"downplayed the legislative history, or read it selectively.").
14'Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 426 n.19 (citing H.R. REP. No. 97-686,
at 12

(1982)).
148 See Davis, supra note 11, at 56 (discussing this phrase in its context in the
FTAIA).
149 H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 12 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487,
2497.
15oSee Davis, supra note 11, at 56 (discussing the selective reading of the
Fifth Circuit's opinion in Den Norske).
15 Kruman, 284 F.3d at 401.
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issue. 15 2 Most case law does, in fact, support the Fifth Circuit's
interpretation of the FTAIA over the Second Circuit's
interpretation.' 53
There is one important exception, however. National Bank of
Canada serves as the case law basis for the Second Circuit's
conclusion. 154 In National Bank of Canada, the Second Circuit held
that antitrust law applies to any anticompetitive conduct that either
reduces the competitiveness of the U.S. market or makes such
conduct directed at the domestic market possible.' 55 The Second
Circuit's reliance on National Bank of Canada, while its own
precedent, is nevertheless persuasive because Congress cited
National Bank of Canada in the legislative
history in describing the
56
FTAIA.1
the
under
intended
it
approach
The Supreme Court's holding in Hartford Fire also supports
the Second Circuit. The Supreme Court's dissent in Hartford Fire
conceded that "it is now well established that the Sherman Act
applies extraterritorially."' 157 In addition, although Hartford Fire did
not address the specific issue involved here, the majority limited the
importance of international comity to the point that such
considerations
are now rarely successful in dismissing antitrust
58
litigation.'

152 Den Norske, 241

F.3d at 429.

Id. at 429-30 (citing, e.g., S. Megga Telecomm. Ltd. v. Lucent Tech., Inc.,
1997 WL 86413 (D. Del. 1997)) (other citations omitted). But see Empagran S.A.
v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 341 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding an
interpretation of the FTAIA that is similar to the Second Circuit's in Kruman);
Metallgesellschaft AG v. Sumitomo Corp., 2003 WL 1665352, at *5 (7th Cir.
2003) (noting that although the Seventh Circuit has not definitively adopted either
interpretation of the FTAIA, case law in the circuit "appears to point in the
direction of the approach taken by the D.C. and Second Circuits.").
154Kruman, 284 F.3d at 401.
153

155Nat'l
156

Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1981).
H.R. REP. No. 97-686, at 11 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487,

2496.
15'Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
582 n.6 (1986)) (other citations omitted).
158 Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798-99; see also Waller, supra note 10, at 565
(noting that "comity as a legal doctrine has seen better days and will rarely be
successful in dismissing antitrust litigation...").
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D. Deterrence and Antitrust Policy
Private antitrust actions have been described as addressing
two purposes: to provide recovery for injured plaintiffs and to deter
anticompetitive conduct. 159 These purposes rarely seem to conflict,
but, when they do, the overriding purpose of antitrust law is to deter
anticompetitive conduct.'
Antitrust laws provide both civil and
criminal penalties to deter anticompetitive conduct.' 6 1 The purpose of
deterrence is further supported by the award of treble damages to
successful plaintiffs in antitrust actions.' 62 63This has a recognizable
deterrent effect on anticompetitive conduct.'
If a foreign company were to ask an attorney whether it would
be liable under U.S. law for participating in a foreign price fixing
cartel that has substantially harmful effects on the U.S. market, under
a Den Norske reading of the FTAIA, "a reasonably prudent counselor
might tell a client that there will probably not be such liability." 164 In
contrast, the Second Circuit's interpretation of U.S. antitrust laws in
Kruman provides individual and corporate plaintiffs harmed by
international cartels, as well as American consumers harmed by the
effects of international cartels, with a remedy likely to deter foreign
conspirators from engaging in such conduct. 65 This better protects
American consumers from, for example, paying inflated prices for oil
and gasoline caused by the anticompetitive conduct of a foreign
cartel. 166 More importantly, it also prevents
American consumers
from being at the mercy of foreign cartels. 167

159 Mehra,

supra note 37, at 280.

160

Id. at 278-79.

161

Epstein, supra note 4, at 345.

162 15

U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000).

163 See

Mehra, supra note 37, at 278 (discussing treble damages as a

deterrent).
'64 Davis,

supra note 11, at 57.
Mehra, supra note 37, at 319-20 (contending that "a deterrence-based
focus clearly suggests that the broader interpretation [of the FTAIA] better accords
with the goal of deterring wrongful conduct.").
166See Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac v.o.f., 241 F.3d 420,
434 (5th Cir. 2001) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
167 See Davis, supra note 11, at 56-57.
165 See
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E. International Law
Even if the Second Circuit's interpretation of the FTAIA is
correct, as this article argues, the dissent in Hatford Fire noted that
"statutes should not be interpreted to regulate foreign persons or
conduct if that regulation would conflict with the principles of
international law." 68 Although allowing for recovery under the
FTAIA is, arguably, a stretch for U.S. antitrust law, the Second
Circuit's interpretation does not prima facie violate international
law. 169
First, since there is little plausible basis to defend private
anticompetitive conduct that fixes prices or reduces output, 17° there
have been significant developments internationally to harmonize
competition rules. 17 1 For instance, since the first attempt at providing
a set of international trade rules in the Havana Charter of 1948,
efforts at harmonizing trade policy have been expressed in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and the
formation of the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). 172 While these
efforts have centered on governmental trade policies, and not private
anticompetitive conduct as such, the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development ("OECD") recently attempted to
address competition policy internationally. 173 Moreover, the
European Union has agreements with the United States and Canada
"to strengthen cooperation between competition authorities" and 174
to
promote dialogue in accordance with the OECD recommendations.

168

Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (Scalia, J.,

dissenting). In accordance with this notion, this section examines the sources of
international law (i.e., treaties, customs, general principles and publicists) to
determine whether there would be any primafacie violation of international law by
the Second Circuit's holding in Kruman. See JANIS & NoYES, supra note 28, at 2022 (discussing the sources of international law).
169 See Kruman v. Christie's Int'l Plc, 284 F.3d 384, 402 (2d Cir. 2002).
170

Epstein, supra note 4, at 366.

171 Id. at 354.
172

Epstein, supra note 4, at 355.

173 id.
174

See European Union Preparatory Acts, Proposal for a Council and

Commission Decision Concluding the Agreement Between European Communities
and the Government of Japan Concerning Cooperation on Anticompetitive
Activities, COM (02) 230, at 3 (Aug. 5, 2002), Celex No. 502PC0230 (2002),
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/pdf/2002/com20O2_0230en01.pdf.
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The EU recently submitted a proposal for a similar agreement with
Japan concerning cooperation on anticompetitive activities. 1 7 In
addition, the United States has entered into Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation treaties with a number of foreign nations
granting
176
foreign purchasers the protection of U.S. antitrust laws.
This brief survey of international agreements implies that
177
international customs already proscribe anticompetitive conduct.
Hence, a reading of the FTAIA that allows for the antitrust laws of
the United States to apply to foreign conduct wouldcustoms.
not prima
178 facie
or international
agreements
international
any
violate
Second, several other nations' domestic laws have granted
domestic organizations the authority to apply their national
anticompetitive laws extraterritorially.179 Indeed, globalization of
economic activity has forced many governments to institute policies
that strike a balance between encouraging domestic companies to
compete internationally and
180 protecting their domestic markets from
transnational enterprises.
Moreover, in many developing countries,
especially in Eastern Europe and Asia, new competition laws have
followed the European or U.S. models.'81
From this brief discussion of the domestic laws of foreign
nations, there appear to be general principles of international law

'
176

See id. at 2.
See Kruman, 284 F.3d at 403 n. 10.

17' See Spencer Weber Waller, The Common Law of InternationalAntitrust,
34 NEw ENG. L. REV. 163 (1999) (arguing that there is a customary international
law against anticompetitive activity); see also Waller, supra note 36, at 535 (noting

that there is growth in antitrust regimes worldwide and at the international level).
,78 See Kruman, 284 F.3d at 402-03 (discussing its decision in the context of
international law).
179 See Waller, supra note 10, at 574 (noting that one example is Germany);
see also Spencer Weber Waller, Bringing Meaning to Interest in Balancing in
Transnational Litigation, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 925, 960-62 (1991)
(discussing other examples).
"0 Ian A. Kerr & Michael Wood, Globalisationand Competition Policy, at 4
(Sept. 14, 2000), at http://www.insead.edu/events/eamsa/papers/kerrwood.pdf.
181 Id.

at 12; see also, e.g., Arya Abhiseka, NGO, Cement Company Face

Possible Court Battle, THE JAKARTA POST, Jan. 8, 2003, at P13 (describing a report
by Indonesian based NGO, Monopoly Watch, to the Indonesian Business
Competition Supervisory Council of foreign cement companies operating as a
cartel).
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against anticompetitive conduct.182 Thus, application of U.S. antitrust
laws to anticompetitive conduct outside the United States, but with
effect in the United States, would
not prima facie violate general
83
law.1
international
of
principles

V. Proposal
Private anticompetitive agreements and hybrid governmentprivate agreements are becoming the new barriers to a truly open and
competitive global marketplace.' 84 Such agreements have adverse
effects on consumers, from higher oil and gas prices to inflated
commissions at auctions.' 85 An ideal proposal would detail how an
international organization, such as the WTO or the United Nations,
could effectively harmonize international
antitrust policy and provide
86
effective enforcement mechanisms.'
Until this ideal can be realized, however, courts should adopt
the Second Circuit's approach in Kruman because the Second
Circuit's interpretation of the FTAIA better accords with the plain
meaning of the statute and its legislative history, and because its
interpretation better serves the deterrence purpose of antitrust law
without violating international law. 8 7 The Second Circuit's approach
better deters anticompetitive conduct across the board."' It also
better protects American consumers from the harmful effects of
international cartels. '89
One of the greatest difficulties in applying the Second
Circuit's approach may be the U.S. Government's potential
reluctance to recognize the judgments of other nations applying their
domestic laws and other nations' potential reluctance to recognize the

182See JANIS

&

NOYES,

supra note 28, at 131 (discussing EU competition law

as a general principle of law).
113See Kerr & Wood, supra note 180, at 12 (noting that the number
of
countries allowing for private rights of action is growing and include more than just
EU member states).
184 Epstein, supra note 4, at 345-46.
'85 Labaton, supra note 3, at 1.
116 See Epstein, supra note 4, at 365-66 (discussing just such a proposal).
187

See Kruman, 284 F.3d at 400-01.

.8 Davis, supra note 11, at 57.
8g9 Kruman,

284 F.3d at 401.
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judgments of U.S. courts applying U.S. antitrust law. 190 Yet, since
there is little justification for price-fixing or output-limiting private
cartels, judgments rendered against such activities should be
recognized.' 1 Moreover, with the increase in poverty rates in the
United States and the drop in median household income, 19 2 the need
to protect consumers from conspiracies is even more pressing. If U.S.
law cannot protect American consumers from foreign conduct that
raises the prices of oil and gasoline, or perhaps even necessities, such
as food or clothing, then consumers may be at the93 mercy of the
monopolistic whim of international corporate cartels.'

VI. Conclusion
The growth of interconnections between commerce and trade
throughout the global marketplace requires fresh approaches to
problems that affect consumers both in the United States and in other
nations. 194 The importance of deterring anticompetitive conduct by
applying and enforcing competition laws is vital to the protection of
consumers. 95 The recent circuit split between the Fifth and Second
Circuits reflects the difficulties in resolving the problems of which
laws should apply to transnational conduct and who should enforce
such laws.' 96 Perhaps the difference in conceptions of competition
laws throughout various nations is an insurmountable barrier to
harmonizing competition laws. 197 Recent international agreements
and recent applications of domestic law suggest, however, that the

See Antonio F. Perez, The International Recognition of Judgments: The
Debate Between Private and Public Law Solutions, 19 BERKELEY J. INTL' L. 44, 46
(2001).
190

'9'

See William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT'L L.

J. 161, 190-91 (2002) (noting that although courts do not enforce foreign criminal
antitrust judgments, civil antitrust suits brought by private parties are very different
and civil antitrust judgments should be recognized).
192 Steven Pearlstein, U.S. Poverty Rate Rises, Income Drops; Increase in
Ranks of Poor is Firstin 8 Years, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2002, at A3.
193 See Den Norske, 241 F.3d at 434 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
194 See Epstein, supra note 4, at 365.

See id. at 345-46.
196 See Davis, supra note 11, at 56-57 (discussing the difficulties involved).
195

197

See Epstein, supra note 4, at 362.
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world may be ready to harmonize its competition policies.98 In the
meantime, consumers must be protected from the effects of such
harmful and unfair activity as the formation of anticompetitive
cartels. The Second Circuit currently provides the most effective
method of providing such protection.

'98 See Waller, supra note 36, at 534-35.

